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5. Approximate bearing on descending parachute sighting by pharmacist in Garrucha:

Discussions with the pharmacist of Garrucha disclosed that he was on his roof at the time of the accident and saw a large white parachute descending and impacting in the sea. There were two separate readings taken on his sighting. One was 79° 15' true and the other was 83° 15' true. Both sightings generally pass through the Able I sea search area based on the position supplied by witness Francisco Simo Orts.

In addition to the pharmacist his assistant also saw the parachute descending. He was located a mile to a mile and one half away. He gave his position as being at the entrance to Maricielo. A reading on his sighting was taken as 93° true. This passes through the southern part of the Able I area.

CONCLUSIONS:

Studies completed as of this date on the above discussed items are not conclusive enough to suggest any positive movements of either the Able I sea search area or the assumed release point. However, studies on survivors Messinger and Buchanan and weapon four tail cover do indicate that if the assumed release point were moved, it would do so in a northerly direction and not to any magnitude such that new ground search areas, not already covered, would be defined. Further studies will be made on the trajectories of Messinger, Buchanan and number four weapon tail plate. Any conclusive results from these studies will be forwarded immediately.

Although it can be postulated that a mid-air low order detonation of No. 4 weapon occurred, there are several factors which do not support such a theory. The following discussion, therefore, is an elaboration of Solution 3 of the SAT dated 7 February 1966.

- a. It is considered that the testimony of Senor Orts is reliable, since other elements of the situation described by him were factual and have been accepted. His account of the large chute and the object suspended by it is an extremely credible description of an essentially complete Mark 28FI in its fully retarded mode.
- b. The existence of peculiarly contaminated parts of the B-52 and KC-135 does not appear to be pertinent to the condition of No. 4 weapon. The engine nacelle was found in an area of relatively high contamination, therefore it was probably "dusted" after ground impact. Although the part of the B-52 tail section anomaly cannot be explained as simply, it nevertheless can be shown that there are many inconsistancies in the measured ground contamination pattern.



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- c. The most probable land areas where a detached weapon secondary might have impacted have been searched thoroughly and repeatedly. All possible ground depressions, small areas of disturbed soil and suspicious holes have been examined by probing or digging with negative results.
- d. With the exception of the detached tail plate of No. 4 weapon, no other identifiable parts of the bomb have been found on land. It is considered that an unrestrained low order detonation of the HE would have expelled relatively large pieces of the nose fairing firing set, firing components, etc., as opposed to the more severe fragmentation resulting from explosion at ground impact as represented by weapons 2 and 3. Further, if a more violent explosion of the primary of No 4 had occurred, it is extremely improbable that the tail section and parachute would have remained intact.

In summary, it is therefore further considered that the events described as Solution 3 constitute the most valid explanation relative to the loss of No. 4 bomb.

- a. No. 4 bomb was struck by another bomb or part of one of the two airplanes with sufficient force to displace the tail plate and deploy the 64 foot chute.
 - b. No further damage occurred.
- c. Contamination of airplane parts is not pertinent to this situation.
- d. A diligent and well-organized search has not revealed any further positive evidence relating to No. 4 weapon.
- e. An appropriate assembly was observed to descend and splash into the Mediterranean Sea.

It is firmly concluded that a reasonably intact Mark 28FI bomb now lies somewhere in a predictable area on the floor of the Mediterranean.

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STAFF STUDY

ADDENDUM TO SAT TEAM STUDY OF 7 FEBRUARY 1966

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
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